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ABSTRACT This paper uses a contingent val-
uation study and an actual donation request 
to assess the impact of behavioral factors on 
hypothetical bias in stated willingness-to-pay 
estimates. Our findings indicate that both the 
number of respondents willing to donate and 
the amount they are willing to donate differ 
substantially between treatments. Behavioral 
factors play a substantial and significant 
role; in particular, the extent of warm glow 
derived from giving and expectations about 
other people’s behavior increase the extent of 
hypothetical bias in stated willingness-to-pay 
estimates. We suggest ways in which this may 
be incorporated in future contingent valuation 
study design. (JEL Q51)
1. Introduction
Assessing people’s willingness to pay for the 
provisioning of environmental goods and ser-
vices is notoriously difficult; most environ-
mental goods and services have no market 
value as markets are missing, and because 
of the lack of institutions that link supply of 
and demand for environmental services, the 
latent demand for environmental services re-
mains unclear (Turner, Pearce, and Bateman 
1994). Environmental valuation methods have 
been developed to assess the demand for en-
vironmental goods and services, but they 
struggle with problems of hypothetical bias. 
Since Diamond and Hausman’s study (1994) 
a number of researchers have addressed the 
question of which factors increase or decrease 
the hypothetical bias of contingent valuation 
(CV) studies (List and Gallet 2001; Murphy 
et al. 2005; Loomis 2011; Brown, Ajzen, and 
Hrubes 2003; Champ and Bishop 2001). The 
focus has been on the lack of incentive com-
patibility and consequentialism in stated sur-
vey methods (Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 2012; 
Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012) and the 
need for sound survey design (Arrow et al. 
1993; Carson 2012; Loomis 2011). 
Recently, a number of studies have revisited 
the NOAA guidelines for stated preference 
studies (Arrow et al. 1993), arguing that the 
consequentialism of stated preference studies 
can be improved by using a binding payment 
vehicle, like a tax mechanism, with a binary 
contribution option and by paying explicit 
attention to the credibility of the valuation 
question and the information provided in the 
stated preference survey (Bishop et al. 2017; 
Johnston et al. 2017). Increasingly, tax mech-
anisms are not a credible payment vehicle for 
financing environmental good provisioning, 
however, as governments around the globe 
are devolving natural resource management 
to the private sector and to nongovernmen-
tal organizations and citizen groups (Cashore 
2002; Kettl 2000). Also, even when a binding 
payment vehicle can be credibly envisioned, 
proposing a binary contribution choice may 
not be realistic (Bateman et al. 2008). Un-
der such circumstances, the design of stated 
preference studies also has to account for the 
public good dimension of environmental good 
provisioning (Carson, Groves, and List 2014; 
Kotchen 2015), something to which the litera-
ture on stated preference methods has paid lit-
tle attention so far (Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 
2012; Harrison and Rütstrom 2008).
The public good dimension of voluntary 
environmental good provisioning gives rise 
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to a number of behavioral factors, like social 
preferences and expectations (Frey and Meier 
2004; Andreoni 1990) that in the environmen-
tal valuation literature have been discussed 
only to a limited extent. Behavioral factors 
that have received attention in the economic 
valuation literature include environmental at-
titudes and revealed proenvironmental behav-
ior (Kotchen and Reiling 2000; Spash 2006, 
2008; Cooper, Poe, and Bateman 2004). Both 
types of behavioral factors will be included in 
this paper’s analysis. 
In order to capture hypothetical bias, we 
create three versions of a stated preference 
survey. The first version is a classical CV sur-
vey and the second version includes a cheap 
talk script (Cummings and Taylor 1999). The 
third version presents respondents with an ac-
tual donation request. Few studies have com-
pared hypothetical and real treatments, and the 
studies that do often endow subjects with do-
nation money. Exceptions are studies by Seip 
and Strand (1992) who compare hypothetical 
and actual willingness to become member of 
an environmental group, Brown et al. (1996) 
who compare hypothetical and actual con-
tributions to road removal in Grand Canyon 
National Park, Champ and Bishop (2001) and 
Poe et al. (2002) who compare hypothetical 
and actual willingness to join a green elec-
tricity program, and Moser et al. (2014) who 
compare hypothetical and actual green con-
sumption decisions in a supermarket. None of 
these studies assesses the role of behavioral 
factors in explaining hypothetical bias and 
individual willingness to donate, however, al-
though Brown, Ajzen, and Hrubes (2006) sug-
gest that social preferences may play a role in 
explaining hypothetical behavior and Champ 
and Bishop (2001) indicate that uncertainty 
(about other people’s behavior?) may explain 
the gap. Our study is to our knowledge the 
first that explicitly assesses the role of behav-
ioral factors in explaining hypothetical bias 
and donation behavior. We focus our analysis 
on social preferences and expectations, social 
expectations functioning both as an anchor 
in case of bounded rationality (Abeler et al. 
2011) and as norm for conditional cooperators 
(Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). 
The aim of our study is twofold: First, 
we want to contribute to the improvement of 
stated preference methods in settings where 
there is no credible binding payment vehicle. 
In such settings, behavioral factors are likely 
to influence people’s willingness to donate. 
By understanding the influence of behavioral 
factors on the stated preference estimates, we 
may control for them in assessing people’s 
willingness to pay. Second, we want to under-
stand the extent to which individuals are will-
ing to voluntarily donate to public good provi-
sioning. This is especially relevant for policy 
makers and practitioners in a growing number 
of environmental domains where traditional 
ways of governmental conservation are aban-
doned, thereby creating room for private ini-
tiatives and comanagement arrangements.
Our findings indicate that both the number 
of respondents that are willing to donate and 
the amount they are willing to donate differ 
significantly between treatments. We find that 
the hypothetical willingness to donate is 3.5 
times higher than the willingness to donate 
derived from the actual donation request. This 
is comparable with the factor of 3 difference 
that List and Gallet (2001) and Murphy et al. 
(2005) find. Income and education significantly 
increase the extent of hypothetical bias (more 
educated and richer respondents overstating 
their willingness to donate more), and higher 
expectations of other people’s donations and 
warm glow feelings increase the extent of hy-
pothetical bias too. Interestingly, we find that 
in the decision to actually transfer money, so-
cial preferences (warm glow) no longer play 
a significant role. In fact, social expectations 
now have the opposite sign: respondents that 
expect that few others will donate are the ones 
that actually transfer the stated amount. 
2. Donation Behavior and 
Behavioral Factors Affecting 
Willingness to Pay 
“Behavioral factors” is a rather broad term. 
It relates to the uncertainty and complexity 
of the task of valuing environmental goods 
and services (List 2001; Bateman et al. 2008; 
Schläpfer and Fischhoff 2012) and to the 
factors determining why certain people are 
more likely to contribute to causes in the en-
vironmental domain (Kotchen and Reiling 
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2000). In addition, the public good dimension 
of environmental goods and services gives 
rise to a number of behavioral issues. Stan-
dard economic theory predicts that individ-
ual actors have little incentive to voluntarily 
contribute to the provisioning of semipublic 
goods because of free-riding, namely, the 
notion that noncontributing actors also ben-
efit from the public good (Samuelson 1954). 
Real-life examples and behavior in economic 
experiments suggest that individual actors do 
voluntarily contribute, either because they 
derive utility from the act of giving—due to 
social preferences (Andreoni 1990) or a de-
sire to conform (Bernheim 1994)—or because 
free-rider behavior can be mitigated through 
shared expectations and norms (Fischbacher 
and Gächter 2010; Frey and Meier 2004). 
This paper focuses on the behavioral factors 
related to voluntary contributions to semipub-
lic good provisioning. In addition, we account 
for a number of factors that have been shown 
to affect willingness to pay estimates, like in-
come and scarcity (e.g., Brander and Koetse 
2011), distance decay (e.g., Bateman et al. 
2006; Hanley, Schläpfer, and Spurgeon 2003), 
bounded rationality and reference dependence 
(e.g., Koetse and Brouwer 2016; Hausman 
2012), and noneconomic motives and atti-
tudes regarding the donation request (Kotchen 
and Reiling 2000; Spash 2006, 2008; Cooper, 
Poe, and Bateman 2004). Below, we briefly 
discuss the different factors and their expected 
impact on hypothetical bias.
Revealed Proenvironmental Behavior
Considering the factors explaining donation 
behavior, De Oliveira, Croson, and Eckel 
(2011) demonstrate that people who already 
donate to social causes are more likely to 
donate to additional causes as well. The un-
derlying reason here may be what Baron 
(2010) coins as the capacity to self-regulate 
and forego private benefits for the sake of so-
cial welfare. In our analysis we account for 
revealed proenvironmental behavior, expect-
ing that subjects who already donate to na-
ture conservation and consume ecologically 
certified products are more likely to donate to 
agrienvironmental conservation as well. With 
regard to the impact on hypothetical bias we 
expect proenvironmental behavior to reduce 
hypothetical bias. We expect this as respon-
dents that have a propensity to donate to social 
causes are likely to have a capacity to self-reg-
ulate and thus are less likely to overstate their 
contributions.
Proenvironmental Attitude
Schkade and Payne (1994) and Kotchen and 
Reiling (2000) show that having a proenviron-
mental attitude increases the likelihood that a 
subject is willing to pay. Milfont and Duckitt 
(2010) review the psychological literature on 
environmental attitudes, finding that import-
ant factors are the subject’s preferences and 
concern for nature (enjoyment, sense of ur-
gency, perceived vulnerability) and perceived 
adequacy of conservation policy and role of 
the government. Kotchen and Reiling (2000) 
analyze whether and how environmental at-
titudes influence stated willingness to pay. 
They indicate that proenvironmental attitudes 
do not only increase donations, but also re-
duce the number of protest votes and illegiti-
mate answers; hence, environmental attitudes 
may have an impact on hypothetical bias too. 
Therefore, we expect a proenvironmental atti-
tude to increase the willingness to pay, and to 
reduce hypothetical bias.
Perceived Legitimacy of the Donation 
Request
We consider the perceived adequacy and role 
of the government (Milfont and Duckitt 2010) 
separately, as government involvement may 
both crowd in or crowd out voluntary con-
tributions to public goods (Frey and Ober-
holtzer-Gee 1997; Rode, Gómez-Baggethun, 
and Krause 2015). For example, Nyborg and 
Rege (2003) indicate that in a setting where 
resource management is voluntary, public 
policy may crowd out intrinsic motivations. In 
our case, the institutional context is that of a 
retreating government. Tyler (2006) indicates 
that under such conditions the likelihood of 
subjects making voluntary contributions will 
depend on the perceived legitimacy of the do-
nation request. Bouma et al. (2014) find that 
respondents who perceive the decentralization 
of natural resource management as legitimate 
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are more likely to contribute than respondents 
who perceive this to be a government task. We 
expect respondents who perceive the donation 
request as legitimate to have a higher willing-
ness to donate. We have no expectation about 
the impact on hypothetical bias.
Warm Glow from Giving (Social 
Preference)
Attention to social preferences has boomed 
since experimental studies showed that ac-
tors are less self-interested than assumed in 
standard economic theory (Mullainathan and 
Thaler 2000). The literature suggests differ-
ent explanations for this behavior, including 
inequality aversion and reciprocity (Charness 
and Rabin 2002) and warm glow (Andreoni 
1990), warm glow being the utility that peo-
ple derive from the act of giving. We expect 
warm glow to increase willingness to pay (see 
also Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) but have 
no expectation about its impact on hypothet-
ical bias.
Social Expectations
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) indicate that 
expectations about other people’s behavior are 
an important factor explaining voluntary con-
tributions. Abeler et al. (2011) find that sub-
jects with high expectations contribute more 
than subjects with low expectations, a finding 
confirmed by Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) 
and Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Sten-
man (2008). Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johans-
son-Stenman (2008) suggest that this outcome 
is driven by conformist behavior, that is, the 
utility that people derive from behaving in line 
with others. Hence, we expect that subjects 
with higher expectations about other people’s 
contributions will display a higher willingness 
to pay. Given that social expectations may 
carry some strategic bias (Harrison and Rüt-
strom 2008), we expect social expectations to 
increase hypothetical bias.
Hypotheses and Hypothesis Testing
As discussed in the introduction, our main 
goal is to assess the impact of behavioral fac-
tors on stated donations and on hypothetical 
bias in stated donations to semipublic good 
provisioning. More specifically, we hypothe-
size that the five behavioral factors we con-
sider affect donations and the extent of hypo-
thetical bias in stated donations. 
In order to test our hypotheses we obtained 
data from CV experiments with hypothetical 
and real donations and estimate separate mod-
els on the data samples obtained. In generic 
form these models are given by
WTPH =  f(Revealed behavior; Attitude;  
Legitimacy; Warm glow; Expectations),  [1]
and
WTPA =  g(Revealed behavior; Attitude;  
Legitimacy; Warm glow; Expectations),  [2]
where WTPH and WTPA represent, respec-
tively, hypothetical and actual willingness to 
donate to the public good, and f( ⋅) and g(⋅) 
represent functions relating behavioral fac-
tors to hypothetical and actual willingness to 
donate, respectively. We estimate the models 
in equations [1] and [2] and subsequently test 
equality of the parameters, using the combi-
natorial test proposed by Poe, Giraud, and 
Loomis (2005), with which we assess the 
impact of behavioral factors on willingness 
to pay and on hypothetical bias in stated will-
ingness to pay. Moreover, we may more accu-
rately assess the relative importance of the dif-
ferent behavioral factors in actual donations to 
a public environmental good. 
To our knowledge this is the first large-
scale study that looks into the impact of be-
havioral factors on hypothetical bias, so there 
is little we can build on in terms of the ex-
pected direction of the behavioral effects. As 
a working hypothesis, we expect the impact of 
most behavioral factors on hypothetical bias 
to have the same direction as their impact on 
donations, except for proenvironmental atti-
tude and revealed behavior, where we expect 
a positive impact on willingness to pay, but a 
negative impact on hypothetical bias.
3. CV and Survey Design
We developed a stated preference survey in 
which we measure behavioral factors related 
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to the public good dimension of environmen-
tal goods and services. We created three ver-
sions of the survey in order to capture hypo-
thetical bias. The first version is a classical CV 
survey, the second version includes a cheap 
talk script (Cummings and Taylor 1999) and 
the third version presents respondents with a 
real donation request. To make sure that the 
hypothetical bias of our hypothetical treat-
ments is as small as possible we are explicit 
about the payment vehicle and provide infor-
mation to contextualize the donation request, 
as suggested by Loomis (2011), Murphy et 
al. (2005) and List and Gallet (2001). Also, 
in line with Johnston et al. (2017), we pay 
explicit attention to the credibility of the in-
formation provided and the background of 
and reasons for requesting a donation, our 
study explicitly testing how these factors af-
fect value estimates and hypothetical bias 
therein. We take account of bounded ratio-
nality (Hausman 2012) by reducing survey 
complexity. We explain the donation request 
as simply as possible and provide additional 
information about the background of the do-
nation request (Johnston et al. 2017; see also 
Appendix A).The donation vehicle is the same 
across treatments: respondents are asked to 
contribute to an existing fund that contracts 
farmers to provide agrienvironmental conser-
vation on their land. Previously, this fund was 
financed by the government, but due to budget 
cuts, agrienvironmental conservation increas-
ingly depends on private cofunding. In addi-
tion to socioeconomic characteristics (age, 
level of education, income, and distance to the 
study site), we collected information about 
respondent characteristics in terms of the five 
behavioral factors. Below we discuss how we 
measured these factors empirically.
1. Revealed proenvironmental behavior: We 
measured revealed proenvironmental be-
havior by asking whether the respondent is 
a member of a nature-related organization, 
and whether the respondent donates to en-
vironmental causes. In addition, we asked 
for the respondent’s assessment of his or 
her share of expenditures on ecologically 
certified groceries.
2. Proenvironmental attitude: We measured 
attitude by asking respondents whether 
they would like to see more attention for 
the protection of biodiversity (species rich-
ness) and nature in national and regional 
policies.
3. Perceived legitimacy of the donation re-
quest: We measured the perceived legit-
imacy of the donation request by asking 
respondents to what extent they agree with 
the development that nature conservation is 
no longer fully funded by the government 
and as a result has become partly depen-
dent upon voluntary contributions by citi-
zens. 
4. Warm glow from giving: We measured the 
warm glow of giving by asking respon-
dents whether they get a good feeling from 
donating to charity.
5. Social expectations: We measured social 
expectations by informing respondents 
that before this study we did a prestudy in 
which we asked a large number of house-
holds how much they would be willing to 
donate. Subsequently, in the survey we 
asked respondents about their expectation 
of the share of donating respondents and 
the average donated amount.1 
For the questions relating to donation be-
havior (warm glow) we used questions from 
the Dutch survey Geven in Nederland, which 
annually collects information about donation 
behavior in the Netherlands (Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2011). For questions about environ-
mental attitudes and perceived legitimacy we 
referred to Milfont and Duckitt (2010). 
The CV question focuses on Farming for 
Nature, a Dutch agrienvironmental conserva-
tion program that specifically focuses on the 
buffer zones of protected areas (Stortelder and 
Kiers 2011) and has proven effective in en-
hancing biodiversity on agricultural land itself 
and in adjacent protected areas (Westerink et 
al. 2013). Until recently, the program was fi-
nanced by the government, but severe budget 
cuts and a belief that consumers are willing 
1 In this study we focus on the extent to which social ex-
pectations help explain the gap between stated and revealed 
willingness to pay. In an accompanying paper (Koetse and 
Bouma 2017) we further analyze the effects of social expec-
tations on donation decisions, and whether feedback about 
people’s expectations affects donations, for example, by pro-
viding a reference point. 
230 May 2019Land Economics
to voluntarily contribute to nature conserva-
tion have made upscaling of the Farming for 
Nature approach dependent upon private cof-
inancing. 
In the CV experiment we explained that 
the payment mechanism is a donation to a 
fund that leases out land to farmers that use 
the Farming for Nature approach. To avoid 
anchoring effects, we presented respondents 
with a payment card including a wide range 
of possible donations. We pretested the range 
twice before survey implementation and also 
provided respondents with the opportunity to 
make a donation that is not included in the list. 
The cheap talk script we used was origi-
nally based on one by Cummings and Taylor 
(1999), but in line with Aadland and Caplan 
(2006) we use a shorter version that basically 
reminds respondents to seriously consider 
their households’ available financial resources 
in answering the survey. Respondents in the 
actual donation treatment were reminded 
twice of the fact that the donation request is 
an actual request (right at the beginning of the 
survey, and also in the explanation of the CV 
experiment). The survey was pretested twice 
and implemented in April 2015. An excerpt 
of the survey is provided in Appendix A; the 
full survey is available upon request. Appen-
dix B contains the three versions of the CV 
question.
4. Data Collection and Descriptive 
Statistics
Respondents were sampled from a Dutch on-
line respondent panel owned by KANTAR,2 
which includes around 124,000 respondents 
from around 65,000 households. The panel is 
established through random sampling, mean-
ing that each household has an equal chance 
of being in the panel as long as it is willing 
to participate, ensuring that the panel is rep-
resentative for the entire Dutch population on 
main variables: age, gender, education, and 
geographical region. The panel is also regu-
larly updated in order to keep the panel rep-
2 KANTAR is a worldwide data and marketing research 
company (www. kantar.com).
resentative, mainly by invitation from KAN-
TAR. Moreover, KANTAR has a substantial 
amount of regularly updated information on 
each respondent, which means that for any 
region in the Netherlands they can apply a 
representative sampling procedure, instead of 
just a random one. All our treatment samples 
were drawn from the panel’s 18 years of age 
or older population separately, with identi-
cal representative sampling for each sample, 
using age, gender, education, and political 
preference (2012 elections) as variables. In 
selecting respondents we paid specific atten-
tion to location, as the CV question refers to 
the Farming for Nature area at a location in 
Twente (east of the Netherlands). While keep-
ing the samples representative in terms of age, 
gender, education, and political preference 
(2012 elections), we oversampled respondents 
who live closer to the study area to avoid low 
variation in donation behavior, as respondents 
living farther from Twente may not be willing 
to donate due to distance decay effects.3 To 
minimize this risk we made rings around the 
study area, ring 1 being the ring closest to the 
study area, and ring 4 being the ring farthest 
from the study area. The sampling procedure 
was aimed at obtaining the following distri-
bution: ring 1, 37.5%; ring 2, 25%; ring 3, 
18.75%; and ring 4, 18.75%. Because this re-
gional oversampling could affect the sample-
wide mean WTP, we include the distance of 
the respondent’s residence to the study loca-
tion as a covariate in our models, thereby test-
ing whether there is a distance decay effect. 
As shown and discussed in the next sections 
we find there is no such effect, suggesting that 
our regional oversampling has had little to no 
effect on our mean WTP estimates. Also, this 
suggests that we are measuring nonuse values 
more than use values.4 
3 Although there is oversampling from regions nearer to 
the study locations, the sampling is such that all treatment 
samples are still representative for the Netherlands in terms 
of age, gender, education, and political preference (2012 
elections).
4 In a parallel study we focus more on landscape use 
values by estimating values for landscape aesthetics (see 
Bouma and Koetse 2016, table 6). In this case we did find 
distance decay effects, clearly showing the differential ef-
fects of distance decay between use and nonuse values.
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Table 1 presents the response rate across 
treatments. The response rate of the first two 
treatments is 42%, whereas the response rate 
of respondents receiving an actual donation 
request is less than 20%. In the analysis we 
account for this difference and the associ-
ated potential sample selection bias by using 
a two-step Heckman model, which we fur-
ther explain in Section 5. In using a two-step 
Heckman model we also control for the dif-
ferences between those that chose to respond 
to the survey, and those that did not: those 
that chose to respond were on average slightly 
older, more highly educated, and more likely 
to consume certified green products and do-
nate to societal goals, as the summary statis-
tics presented in Table 2 indicate.
With regard to the CV question, the results 
in Table 3 indicate that the willingness to do-
nate and average donation of donating respon-
dents differ significantly between treatments. 
The last column shows the number of respon-
dents that actually transferred money, in the 
third treatment group. 
Between the standard CV and the cheap 
talk CV questions there is no significant 
difference in the amount donated and will-
ingness to contribute (Mann-Whitney test 
z-value of 0.365). This is partly in line with 
recent findings by Howard et al. (2017), who 
find that the effect of cheap talk scripts in a 
choice experiment setting is transient. How-
ever, between the standard CV and the actual 
donation request, and between the cheap talk 
CV and the actual donation request, there is a 
significant difference, both in the number of 
people willing to donate and in the donated 
amount (Mann-Whitney z-values of –10.2 and 
Table 1
Response Rate of the Different Treatments 
Response Rate (percent)
Number of Completed 
Questionnaires
Number of Questionnaires 
Distributed
Treatment 1: Standard CV 43 462 1,072
Treatment 2: Cheap talk CV 41 437 1,071
Treatment 3: Donation request CV 18 434 2,472
Table 2
Summary Statistics, Including Nonresponse
Response Nonresponse
Percentage female 50 48
Age (years) 50 47
Percentage above 50 years old 51 41
Percentage of highly educated (technical college and university) 38 34
Gross income (euros) 50.229 49.505
Average number of funds the respondent donates to 5.23 4.75
Percentage of respondents who consume certified green products 40 34
Distance from Twente (kilometers) 86 88 
Number of respondents 1,333 3,282
Table 3
Hypothetical, Semihypothetical (Cheap Talk), and Actual Willingness to Donate 
Treatment 1: 
Standard CV, 
Stated
Treatment 2: 
Cheap Talk CV, 
Stated
Treatment 3: 
Donation Request, 
Stated
Treatment 3: 
Donation Request, 
Revealed
Percentage willing to contribute  56  58  23  7
Average donation of donating respondents 
(euros)
 23  22  16 17
Number of donating respondents 259 253 100 30
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–10.6, respectively). The combined effect is 
that the standard CV question overestimates 
the willingness to donate by a factor 3.5, com-
parable with the factor of 3 difference found 
by List and Gallet (2001) and Murphy et al. 
(2005). 
In further analyzing this treatment effect 
in the next section, we control for potential 
selection bias resulting from the lower re-
sponse rate in the donation request treatment. 
Results show that although there are selection 
effects, these effects do not lead to selection 
bias. Also, the summary statistics presented 
in Table 4 indicate that there are no signifi-
cant differences in respondent characteristics, 
beliefs, and preferences between treatments. 
Exceptions are respondent expectations of the 
percentage of respondents that will contrib-
ute and the stated average donation amount, 
which we will account for in the analysis. 
Specifically, between treatments 1 and 2, 
differences in expectations are not signif-
icant, but between the first two treatments 
and treatment 3, differences are significant 
(Mann-Whitney test z-values of –5.8 and 
–5.2, respectively, for the percentage of do-
nating households, and z-values of –3.9 and 
–4.8 for the average donation). 
Note that only 7% of the respondents in 
the actual donation treatment actually made a 
donation to the Farming for Nature fund. In-
terestingly, respondents who made a donation 
transferred exactly the amount they stated, but 
only a third of the respondents who indicated 
wanting to contribute actually did. This may 
have to do with the fact that respondents had 
only a couple of weeks to make the transfer 
and did not receive a reminder as KANTAR 
(the panel data owner) did not want us to 
bother its respondents with reminders and fol-
low up emails. Still, we further analyze actual 
donation behavior in the next section to better 
understand what is going on. 
5. Model and Estimation Results
For model estimation we use a two-step Heck-
man model in order to correct for potential 
sample selection bias, especially for the real 
donation treatment, which had a much lower 
response rate than the hypothetical treatment 
Table 4
Summary Statistics per Treatment Group 
Treatment 1: 
Standard CV
Treatment 2: 
Cheap Talk CV
Treatment 3: 
Donation Request
Average donation (including nondonating respondents) 12.9 (31.3) 12.7 (31.6)  3.6 (10.0)
Socioeconomic characteristics
 Average monthly disposable income per household member 493.8 (476.6) 448.2 (383.0) 510.3 (454.1)
 Dummy: Age above 50 years (percent) 53 55 52
 Percentage highly educated 37 34 44
 Average distance from Twente (kilometers) 86.7 (49.7) 85.3 (47.9) 87.5 (50.7)
Revealed proenvironmental behavior
 Average percentage of ecologically certified groceries 11.7 10.6 10.9
 Average percentage of respondents who already donate to 
nature organizations 
42 36 35
Proenvironmental attitude
 Respondent believes that biodiversity should be better protected 
(percent)
53 52 50
Perceived legitimacy of the donation request
 Respondent believes it just that nature conservation has become 
dependent on private contributions (percent)
28 28 26
Warm glow from giving
 Respondent gets warm glow from giving (percent) 47 44 46
Social expectations
 Average expected percentage of donating respondents 24.6 (17.9) 25.2 (18.3) 19.0 (16.3)
 Average expected donation per donating respondent 22.1 (24.4) 22.4 (26.0) 16.4 (20.6)
Number of respondents 462 437 434
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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and the cheap talk treatment. In the model we 
first estimate the probability of the respondent 
participating in the survey, and second the re-
spondent’s willingness to donate. We do this 
to account for potential sample selection bias 
arising from the fact that the characteristics of 
the group responding to the survey are some-
what different for the response and the non-
response groups (Heckman 1979), but most 
of all because nonresponse is much larger for 
the actual donation treatment, implying there 
might be treatment-specific selection effects. 
We conduct three types of analyses. First, 
we perform an analysis of the pooled treatment 
data in order to assess the relative importance 
of the different behavioral factors. Second, we 
analyze the three treatments separately. We do 
this to assess the differential impact of behav-
ioral factors on donations, with the central aim 
of obtaining insights into the factors that de-
termine hypothetical behavior. In this analysis 
we use three model specifications in which we 
gradually add relevant explanatory variables. 
We start with a basic model that includes only 
respondent characteristics. We subsequently 
add revealed behavior and environmental at-
titudes (proenvironmental attitudes and per-
ceived legitimacy), and finally we add social 
preferences (warm glow) and social expecta-
tions. Although Gächter and Renner (2010) 
argue that when belief elicitation is not incen-
tivized there is no significant impact of expec-
tations on the amount donated, to avoid po-
tential endogeneity issues we use the expected 
percentage of other respondents donating in-
stead of the expected donation amount (which 
may be endogenous to a respondent’s dona-
tion; see Costa-Gomes, Huck, and Weizsäcker 
2014 and Smith 2013). In each of the models 
discussed so far, the first step of the Heckman 
estimation, namely, the probability of the re-
spondent answering the survey, is identical. 
Given that we used a respondent panel, we 
have information about nonrespondents, in-
cluding age, gender, education, income, and 
revealed proenvironmental behavior, which 
we use in the first estimation step. 
Third, we zoom in on treatment 3, the ac-
tual donation request, in order to uncover the 
factors that determine which respondents 
actually transfer funds. First, we repeat the 
Heckman analysis, replacing the dependent 
variable “stated donation amount” with the 
dependent variable “transferred donation 
amount.” Second, we analyze the subsample 
of respondents that indicate they are willing to 
donate. On this subsample we conduct a pro-
bit analysis to assess the probability that the 
respondent actually transfers the funds.5 
Estimation Results: Pooled Treatment 
Data
Table 5 summarizes the results of the pooled 
treatment data analysis. There are several in-
teresting findings. First, the actual donation 
treatment (treatment 3) has a statistically 
significant negative impact on both the deci-
sion to respond to the survey and the donated 
amount. In addition, revealed preferences for 
green consumption and revealed donation be-
havior are important explanatory factors with 
respect to response rate; respondents that al-
ready donate and consume ecologically certi-
fied products are more likely to respond. With 
respect to the donated amount, the findings 
indicate that hypothetical bias in both the 
standard and cheap talk CV treatments is sub-
stantial. 
Second, all of the behavioral factors have 
the expected impacts; a proenvironmental atti-
tude and perception that the donation request is 
legitimate increase donations, and warm glow 
feelings and a positive expectation about the 
number of people donating increase donations 
as well. We also find that people who already 
donate to similar goals and have a higher pro-
pensity for green consumption donate more. 
There are also clear income and education ef-
fects, but no distance decay effect, which may 
be explained by the fact that we are measuring 
nonuse rather than use values. 
Third, expectations about other people’s 
behavior are influenced by treatment. Inter-
estingly, when including respondent expec-
tations, the donation request treatment has a 
smaller and statistically insignificant nega-
tive impact on the donation amount. Hence, 
hypothetical bias seems to affect the donated 
5 For robustness we also conducted a logit regression, but 
since this did not change the findings we do not present those 
results here. Results are available upon request from the au-
thors. All model estimations were done using Stata 11.
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Table 5
Heckman Model Explaining Willingness to Donate (Amount), Accounting for Nonresponses
Basic 
Model
Plus 
Revealed 
Behavior
 Plus 
Proenvironmental 
Attitude
Plus 
Legitimacy 
(Perceived)
Plus 
Warm 
Glow
Plus Social 
Expectations
Step 2: Donated Amount 
Constant 8.77***
(3.60)
4.47
(3.81)
1.71
(4.01)
–0.22
(4.00)
–1.88
(4.14)
–6.69
(4.47)
Treatment effects
 Cheap talk treatment  
 (treatment 2)
0.18
(2.11)
0.99
(2.09)
1.33
(2.14)
1.41
(2.13)
1.16
(2.14)
0.29
(3.60)
 Donation request   
 treatment (treatment 3)
–9.05***
(2.48)
–8.68***
(2.52)
–8.43***
(2.59)
–7.93***
(2.59)
–8.20***
(2.64)
–4.38
(3.73)
Socioeconomic characteristics
 Respondent above 50 3.50*
(1.82)
3.14*
(1.81)
2.44
(1.87)
2.51
(1.86)
2.71
(1.88)
2.67
(1.86)
 Distance to Twente   
 (kilometers)
0.003
(0.02)
0.005
(0.02)
0.006
(0.02)
0.007
(0.02)
0.009
(0.02)
0.008
(0.02)
 Monthly disposable   
 income per household   
 member
0.008***
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
 Respondent highly   
 educated 
4.81***
(1.83)
3.86**
(1.82)
3.39*
(1.87)
2.71
(1.88)
2.59
(1.89)
3.25*
(1.88)
Revealed proenvironmental behavior 
 Respondent donates to   
 nature conservation
6.15***
(1.79)
4.14**
(1.88)
3.21*
(1.89)
2.33
(1.94)
2.06
(1.92)
 Percentage ecologically   
 certified groceries   
 consumed per week 
0.16***
(0.06)
0.14**
(0.06)
0.14**
(0.06)
0.12**
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
Proenvironmental attitude
 Respondent believes   
 biodiversity should be   
 better protected 
7.51***
(1.83)
8.03***
(1.83)
7.24***
(1.85)
6.31***
(1.85)
Perceived legitimacy of the donation request
 Respondent believes it   
 just to cofinance nature 
 conservation
7.93***
(1.94)
7.60***
(1.94)
7.06***
(1.94)
Warm glow 
 Respondent receives a   
 warm glow from 
giving
5.38***
(1.83)
5.50***
(1.82)
Social expectations 
 Expected percentage of   
 donating households
0.23***
(0.09)
 Cheap talk × Social   
 expectation
0.03
(0.12)
 Actual request ×   
 Social expectation
–0.14
(0.12)
Step 1: Probability of Response
Cheap talk treatment 
(treatment 2)
–0.03
(0.06)
–0.03
(0.06)
–0.03
(0.06)
–0.04
(0.06)
–0.04
(0.06)
–0.04
(0.06)
Donation request treatment 
(treatment 3)
–0.72***
(0.06)
–0.72***
(0.06)
–0.73***
(0.06)
–0.74***
(0.06)
–0.74***
(0.06)
–0.74***
(0.06)
Age 0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
Distance to Twente 
(kilometers)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
–0.00
(0.00)
(table continued on following page)
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amount directly and indirectly through its 
effects on the expectation of other people’s 
behavior. The latter suggests that respondents 
apparently anticipate hypothetical behavior 
by others in a hypothetical donation request. 
We compare the statistical significance of 
the different models by comparing predicted 
donations with stated donations. We find that 
the correlation between predicted and stated 
donations is 0.26 for the basic model (R2 of 
0.07), 0.34 for the model including individual 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences (revealed 
behavior, proenvironmental attitude, legit-
imacy; R2 of 0.12), and 0.37 for the model 
that also includes social preferences and ex-
pectations (R2 of 0.14). Hence, adding prior, 
revealed behavior and environmental attitudes 
improves the explanatory power of the model 
most, but adding social preferences and ex-
pectations also improves the explanatory 
power of the analysis. The fact that the inverse 
Mills ratio of the different models is insignif-
icant suggests that although there clearly is 
selection, especially in treatment 3, this has 
not led to any biases in our estimates. We also 
estimate Heckman models with alternative 
model specifications, including explanatory 
variables such as gender and political affilia-
tion, but since this does not affect the findings 
(and given that coefficients on these addi-
tional variables prove to be statistically insig-
nificant) we do not present the findings here.
Estimation Results: Treatment-Specific 
Analysis
Table 6 presents the results of the treatment- 
specific analysis, which is aimed mainly at 
demonstrating the effects of the behavioral 
factors on hypothetical bias. The most im-
portant results are that point estimates on 
almost all behavioral explanatory variables 
(exception is the percentage of ecologically 
certified groceries consumed per week) are 
substantially larger in the hypothetical treat-
ments (treatments 1 and 2) than in the actual 
donation treatment (treatment 3), and that 
most behavioral factors remain significant in 
explaining the variation in donations in the 
actual donation treatment (treatment 3). Also, 
the effects of some important socioeconomic 
factors appear to be different in the hypothet-
ical and the real donation treatments, specifi-
cally income, age, and education. 
In order to test the statistical significance of 
differences between the coefficients obtained 
for the different treatments, we apply the ran-
dom sampling procedure proposed by Poe, 
Giraud, and Loomis (2005, 359). Because the 
most interesting differences are between treat-
Table 5
Heckman Model Explaining Willingness to Donate (Amount), Accounting for Nonresponses (continued)
Basic 
Model
Plus 
Revealed 
Behavior
 Plus 
Proenvironmental 
Attitude
Plus 
Legitimacy 
(Perceived)
Plus 
Warm 
Glow
Plus Social 
Expectations
Log gross annual income 0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
Respondent highly educated 0.10**
(0.05)
0.10**
(0.05)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.12**
(0.05)
Number of funds 
respondent donates to
0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
Respondent consumes green 
products
0.08*
(0.05)
0.08*
(0.05)
0.08*
(0.05)
0.09*
(0.05)
0.09*
(0.05)
0.09*
(0.05)
Constant –0.75*
(0.43)
–0.75*
(0.43)
–0.80*
(0.44)
–0.82*
(0.44)
–0.82*
(0.44)
–0.82*
(0.44)
Number of observations 3,534 3,534 3,497 3,492 3,476 3,476
Number of censored 
observations
2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445 2,445
Inverse Mills ratio –3.28
(2.60)
–2.58
(2.79)
–2.59
(2.86)
–2.63
(2.84)
–2.47
(2.94)
–2.56
(2.84)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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ment 1 and treatment 3 we compare only coef-
ficients from these two treatments. The results 
from Poe, Giraud, and Loomis’s (2005) test 
show that differences in point estimates are 
statistically significant for income (p-value 
0.015), education (p-value 0.050), social ex-
pectations (p-value 0.056), and warm glow 
(p-value 0.019).6 These insights suggest that 
socioeconomic (especially education and in-
come) and behavioral factors (especially so-
cial expectations and warm glow) may affect 
donations, judging by the statistical signifi-
cance of coefficients in treatment 3, but also 
affect the degree of hypothetical bias, judging 
by the differential impact of these factors on 
donations in treatments 1 and 3.
Overstating the willingness to pay or do-
nate thereby appears to be related to most of 
the social behavioral factors included in our 
analysis, but in terms of magnitude and sta-
tistical significance the results are most pro-
nounced for income and education and for 
social expectations and warm glow. In addi-
tion, it appears that the relative importance 
of explanatory variables changes between 
treatments. For example, warm glow is es-
pecially important for explaining behavior in 
the standard CV treatment, whereas a proen-
vironmental attitude is an important factor 
explaining donation behavior in the donation 
request. This is in line with Kotchen and Reil-
ing’ (2000) findings that a proenvironmen-
tal attitude reduces illegitimate answers and 
protest votes. Furthermore, it is interesting 
that revealed donation behavior and green 
consumption appear to be significant factors 
in the basic model, but when social expecta-
tions, environmental attitude, warm glow, and 
perceived legitimacy are included, their sig-
nificance wanes. This seems to indicate that 
revealed behavior is not correlated only with 
individual preferences, but is correlated with 
many other behavioral factors, such as social 
expectations, perceived legitimacy, and warm 
glow, as well. 
6 For completeness, differences in point estimates are sta-
tistically insignificant for respondents above 50 years of age 
(p-value 0.336), distance to Twente in kilometers (p-value 
0.294), revealed behavior (p-values 0.350 and 0.441, respec-
tively), proenvironmental attitude (p-value 0.338), and per-
ceived legitimacy (p-value 0.212).
Estimation Results, Actual Donation 
Treatment: Who Transfers? 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of 
the actual donation treatment, focusing on 
respondents who actually transfer funds. For 
this we set all positive donations that were 
not transferred equal to zero, in other words, 
we treat all nontransferred donations as zero 
donations (see Table 3 for details). The find-
ings of the Heckman model with these actual 
transferred donations as the dependent vari-
able are presented in Appendix C. The results 
indicate that disposable income, the perceived 
legitimacy of the donation request, and beliefs 
about the need for and importance of biodiver-
sity conservation continue to affect donations. 
Expectations about what others will do and 
warm glow feelings no longer have a signif-
icant impact. The average percentage of eco-
logically certified groceries that the respon-
dent purchases remains a significant indicator 
of respondents’ actual donations. When we 
zoom in on the factors that explain whether 
respondents who state a positive willingness 
to donate also make the promised donation, 
we find something interesting. As the findings 
in Table 7 indicate, respondents who actually 
transfer the money are the ones who believe 
that others will not donate, or, in other words, 
the higher the expected number of other peo-
ple donating, the lower the likelihood that the 
respondent transfers the stated amount. 
Clearly, given our limited sample size, 
further research is needed to test whether 
these findings hold for a larger sample, but 
the current findings indicate that the factors 
determining stated willingness to pay differ 
significantly and substantially from the fac-
tors that determine actual donation behavior. 
More specifically, feelings of warm glow 
and the expectation of others donating have 
a strong, positive impact on stated donation 
amounts, but these effects disappear when an-
alyzing what explains the actually transferred 
amounts. Social expectations do affect the 
probability that a stated donation amount is 
actually transferred, but in the opposite direc-
tion, that is, people with lower expectations 
about the percentage of donating households 
are more likely to actually transfer the stated 
donation amount.
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Caveats apply, as respondents had only a 
couple of weeks to make the transfer. Still, the 
findings suggest that more research is war-
ranted to better understand donation behavior 
and the role of behavioral factors, and to use 
this information for the improvement of stated 
preference methods and understanding of hy-
pothetical bias therein.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: first, to 
assess the extent of hypothetical bias in CV 
studies and the impact of behavioral factors 
on this bias, in order to improve the design 
of stated preference methods, and second, to 
understand people’s willingness to donate to 
semipublic good provisioning, in order to as-
sess the extent to which private financing of 
public goods may substitute or complement 
public financing. For this we performed a CV 
experiment, using three treatments: a treat-
ment with a standard hypothetical CV ques-
tion as control, a treatment with a hypothetical 
CV question including a cheap talk script, and 
a treatment with an actual donation request. 
Our analyses generated four key findings, 
which we briefly summarize below.
First, we find that on average, respondents 
in the actual donation request treatment are 
less likely to donate and also donate less. Spe-
cifically, the willingness to donate is half that 
of the standard CV and cheap talk CV treat-
ment, and the donation amount is around 30% 
lower. The combined effect is that the stan-
dard CV treatment overestimates the willing-
ness to donate by a factor of 3.5, which is in 
line with the literature (e.g., List and Gallet 
2001). Further, in line with Moser, Raffaelli, 
and Notaro’s (2014) results, we find that the 
cheap talk script has no effect on the willing-
ness to donate. While Cummings and Taylor 
(1999) suggest that the cheap talk script tack-
les the hypothetical bias of CV studies, we do 
not find the cheap talk CV treatment to have 
a significant impact on reducing hypothetical 
bias, neither in reducing the estimated proba-
bility that respondents donate nor in reducing 
the donated amount.
Second, we find that behavioral factors 
play a major role in stated donation behavior. 
Specifically, we find that a proenvironmental 
attitude, warm glow feelings, a perception 
that the donation request is legitimate, and a 
positive expectation that others will donate 
significantly and substantially increase the 
stated donation amount. Also, we find that the 
higher the share of ecologically certified gro-
ceries purchased by the respondent, the higher 
the stated donation amount, and that income 
and education increase stated donations sig-
nificantly. Distance decay effects have no sig-
nificant impact.
Third, we find that the significance and ex-
planatory power of socioeconomic and behav-
ioral factors decreases substantially in the real 
donation treatment, implying that these fac-
tors affect actual donations less and increase 
the amount of hypothetical bias in CV esti-
mates. Socioeconomic factors that increase 
hypothetical bias are income and education. 
With respect to behavioral factors, two stand 
out: Warm glow feelings increase the willing-
ness to donate more in the hypothetical treat-
Table 7
Probit Analysis of Probability That Respondents 
with Positive Stated Willingness to Pay Actually 
Transfer the Donation
Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect
Constant 0.80 (0.49)
Respondent above 50 0.36 (0.31)
Distance to Twente 
(kilometers)
–0.00 (0.00)
Monthly disposable income 
per household member
0.00 (0.00)
Respondent highly educated 0.31 (0.30)
Respondent donates to 
nature conservation
–0.70** (0.34) –0.22
Percentage ecologically 
certified groceries 
consumed per week
–0.00 (0.00)
Respondent believes 
biodiversity should be 
better protected
0.47 (0.35)
Respondent believes it just 
to cofinance conservation
0.69** (0.32) 0.23
Respondent receives warm 
glow from giving
–0.39 (0.34)
Expected percentage of 
donating households
–0.02* (0.01) –0.005
Number of observations 96
Adjusted pseudo-R2 0.14
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, ** Statistically significant at 10% and 5%, respectively.
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ments, and respondents’ expectations about 
other people’s donation do too. Specifically, 
in the standard CV and cheap talk CV treat-
ment respondents expect, on average, that 
25% of the respondents will donate, while in 
the actual donation request treatment this is 
19%. These higher expectations in hypotheti-
cal situations seem to trigger an overstatement 
of the stated donation amount, making social 
behavioral factors an important driver of hy-
pothetical bias in stated preference studies 
using a nonbinding payment vehicle. For the 
more individual behavioral factors (revealed 
behavior, proenvironmental attitude, and per-
ceived legitimacy) effects are more uncertain; 
although point estimates differ substantially 
between treatments, the differences are not 
statistically significant. 
Fourth, when considering the actual do-
nation amounts that were transferred in the 
real donation treatment, we find that social 
expectations have the opposite effect: respon-
dents who believe that few others will donate 
are more likely to actually transfer the stated 
donation amount. These findings have to be 
interpreted with caution because the number 
of observed transactions is small and respon-
dents received no reminder to transfer the 
stated amount. Still, they are in line with find-
ings from the experimental literature, which 
suggest that roughly 10% of the population is 
altruistic and driven by intrinsic motivations, 
and that the majority consists of conditional 
cooperators who let their contribution depend 
on what others do (Fischbacher, Gächter, and 
Fehr 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). 
It is this majority that says it will contrib-
ute, but when the moment comes to transfer 
funds, their contributions are conditional on 
what others do. Without a mechanism to trig-
ger mass donations like, for example, through 
crowdfunding or mass awareness campaigns, 
this majority is unlikely to voluntarily contrib-
ute to private provision of public goods. 
7. Discussion
By considering the impact of behavioral fac-
tors on voluntary donations to a semipub-
lic environmental good, our results confirm 
and complement the recent stated preference 
recommendations made by Johnston et al. 
(2017). Our results indicate that the hypothet-
ical bias of stated preference methods in these 
settings is largely driven by warm glow and 
social expectations, respondents considering 
their expectation of other people’s behavior 
before they decide what amount to state. The 
study further confirms the importance of re-
spondent attitudes and motivations, and of the 
perceived legitimacy of the donation request. 
It recommends that these factors be tested 
during pretesting of stated preference valu-
ation studies, especially when a nonbinding 
payment vehicle or a potentially noncredible 
payment vehicle is used. 
More specifically, with regard to warm 
glow, the findings indicate that CV studies 
may be improved by making respondents 
aware of the possible effect of warm glow on 
stated donations, similar to using a cheap talk 
script. Another and potentially more effec-
tive approach is to explicitly ask respondents 
whether they get warm glow feelings from 
donating, and to control for these effects in 
a regression setting—similar to the approach 
used in this paper. It also implies that mean 
donations are no longer the metric of interest, 
but rather the outcome of a regression analy-
sis from which the effects of warm glow are 
filtered out. 
With regard to people’s tendency to con-
form to what they expect others will do, dif-
ferent processes may be at work, each with 
different potential consequences for the de-
sign of CV studies. First, when people are 
uncertain about their own value for a specific 
nonmarket good or service, they may refer to 
how they think other people value the good. 
A solution to this specific issue, in line with 
Champ and Bishop (2001), is to measure 
people’s level of certainty on their stated do-
nation, and remove people with lower levels 
of certainty from the sample. This approach 
has the disadvantage that in many settings the 
sample could be reduced substantially. An 
alternative or complementary approach may 
be to use insights from the preference learn-
ing literature (e.g., Holmes and Boyle 2005), 
for example, by allowing people to form their 
preferences and values during their partic-
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ipation in the study. Although choice exper-
iments are more naturally suited for such a 
process because respondents are confronted 
with various choice questions, CV studies 
may incorporate this by including a repetition 
of valuation questions, using, for example, 
the learning design proposed by Bateman et 
al. (2008). Second, people may be uncertain 
about whether they want to contribute and 
will therefore make their contribution condi-
tional on what others do (e.g., Fischbacher, 
Gächter, and Fehr 2001). CV studies could 
more explicitly account for the conditional-
ity of the stated donation amounts, especially 
when a voluntary contribution mechanism 
is used. For example, by asking respondents 
about their expectations of other people’s do-
nation behavior and relating this to the stated 
donation amounts, the conditionality of the 
stated donations can be made explicit. More-
over, value estimates for different levels of ex-
pectations can be derived and used as upper 
and lower bounds. Ultimately, more research 
on this issue is needed, which may focus on 
measuring the impact of people’s expectations 
on their donations and the resulting value es-
timate compared to value estimates obtained 
for the same CV questions but using nonvol-
untary binding payment schemes. Given that 
governments around the globe are devolving 
natural resource management to civic groups 
and nongovernmental organizations, simply 
demanding that CV studies use a binding 
payment vehicle that is credible may not be 
realistic, and more attention needs to be paid 
to the impact of social behavioral factors on 
stated preferences estimates.
Finally, given the extent of hypothetical 
bias found in this study, an important ques-
tion is to what extent estimates from stated 
preference and specifically CV studies can be 
used to assess the value society derives from 
environmental goods. In this respect, the lit-
erature consistently indicates that the hypo-
thetical bias of stated preference studies is 
approximately a factor 3; we find a factor of 
3.5 in our analysis. Applying this correction 
factor to standard hypothetical CV results is a 
possible way to arrive at more accurate value 
estimates. Problematic in this respect, next to 
the crudeness of the approach, is that when 
we consider only those people that transfer 
the donation in the real donation treatment, 
the difference between actual and hypotheti-
cal donations goes up by around a factor of 
11, because only 7% of respondents transfer 
their donation instead of the 23% that indi-
cated a willingness to contribute. The discus-
sion then becomes how to interpret why only 
7%, instead of the 23% that indicated want-
ing to make a donation, actually transferred 
their donation. One explanation is that this is 
simply because we could not send out remind-
ers, and people in the actual donation treat-
ment needed more time. In that case, the 23% 
would be a realistic estimate of the number 
of respondents with a positive willingness to 
pay, and the factor of 3 would hold. Another 
explanation would be that a substantial por-
tion of the 23% of respondents with a positive 
willingness to pay for biodiversity protection 
would consist of conditional cooperators who 
need information about other people’s contri-
butions before they actually transfer the stated 
amount. In that case, the 23% would still be a 
realistic estimate of the number of people with 
a positive willingness to pay for biodiversity 
protection, but given a nonbinding payment 
vehicle, the 7% would be the more realistic 
estimate of people’s willingness to donate 
to environmental good provisioning. Hence, 
when looking for an estimate of people’s val-
ues for environmental good provisioning, the 
average real WTP of a representative person 
in the Netherlands would be (23/100 × 17 =) 
€3.91, but when looking for an estimate of the 
average real willingness to donate of a repre-
sentative Dutch person, €1.12 (7/100 × 16) 
would be the better estimate—both compared 
to the €12.90 for the standard CV approach. 
Ultimately, more work is needed to distin-
guish between willingness to pay and will-
ingness to donate estimates, especially since 
credible and binding payment vehicles are 
scarce. Clearly, when a credible and binding 
payment vehicle is available, this is the first 
best option, but given the second best world 
we often live in, controlling for behavioral 
factors in stated preference studies that use a 
nonbinding payment vehicle is, in our view, 
an important addition to the recent recom-
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mendations by Johnston et al. (2017) on stated 
preference methods.
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